Abstract. Blue Midnight Wish (BMW) is one of the fastest SHA-3 candidates in the second round of the competition. In this paper we study the compression function of BMW and we obtain practical partial collisions in the case of BMW-256: we show a pair of inputs so that 300 pre-specified bits of the outputs collide (out of 512 bits). Our attack requires about 2 32 evaluations of the compression function. The attack can also be considered as a near-collision attack: we give an input pair with only 122 active bits in the output, while generic algorithm would require 2 55 operations for the same result. A similar attack can be developed for BMW-512, which will gives message pairs with around 600 colliding bits for a cost of 2 64 . This analysis does not affect the security of the iterated hash function, but it shows that the compression function is far from ideal. We also describe some tools for the analysis of systems of additions and rotations, which are used in our attack, and which can be useful for the analysis of other systems.
Introduction
Blue Midnight Wish (BMW) is a candidate in the SHA-3 hash function competition [7] which made it to the second round of the competition, but was not selected as a finalist. It is one of the fastest second round candidates in software, and belongs to the ARX family, using only additions, rotations, and xors.
BMW is built by iterating a compression function, similarly to the ubiquitous Merkle-Damgård paradigm [5, 9] . More precisely, BMW uses a chaining value twice as large as the output of the hash function (this is known as wide-pipe, or Chop-MD), and uses a final transformation similar to the HMAC construction. There are several security proofs for this mode of operation and similar modes [2] [3] [4] , which essentially show that if the compression function behaves like a random function, then the hash function will behave like a random function (up to some level determined by the width of the chaining variable).
In this paper we explain how to find partial-collisions in the BMW-256 compression function. The same technique could be used to find partial-collisions in Supported by a grant from the Villum Kann Rasmussen Foundation.
the BMW-512 compression function, but the complexity would be too high to carry out the attack in a reasonable amount of time, and so we have not implemented this attack. The attacks are not affected by the value of the security parameter of BMW.
Compression function attacks
A natural step in the analysis of iterated hash functions is to study the compression function. Most attacks on the compression function do not lead to attacks on the iterated hash function, but they can invalidate the assumptions of the security proofs. This does not weaken the hash function in itself, but it can undermine the confidence in the design, because the security of the hash function is no longer a consequence of a simple assumption (namely the security of the compression function).
Recently, new results have shown that some attacks on the compression function can be integrated inside the security proof of the mode of operation [2] . This shows that the security of the hash function does not need a truly perfect compression function: some classes of weaknesses of the compression function cannot be used to attack the iterated hash function. As a general rule, it seems that most attacks that require control over the chaining value can be covered by this kind of proofs. However, those attacks usually reveal some unwanted properties of the function, and might be extended to attacks on the full hash function using more advanced techniques.
To put such attacks into perspective, one might look at the attacks on MD5. The first attack on the compression function was found in 1993 by den Boer and Bosselaers [6] , using a very simple differential path. This attack did not threaten the iterated hash function, but the path used in the attack is a core element of the successful attack of Wang et al. in 2005 [12] .
Description of BMW
BMW comes in four variants BMW-n, with n ∈ {224, 256, 384, 512}, returning output size n. There are two variants of the BMW compression functions; The BMW-256 compression function is used in both BMW-224 and BMW-256, and the BMW-512 compression function is used in both BMW-384 and BMW-512.
The compression function of BMW-256 takes two inputs, H and M , of 16 32-bit words each. The general structure of the compression function is shown in Figure 1 . It consists of three functions named f 0 , f 1 , f 2 . The function f 0 applies an invertible linear transformation P to H ⊕ M and adds H wordwise modulo 2 32 . We denote by ' ' modular addition, by ' ' modular subtraction, and by '⊕' the exclusive or. The output of f 0 is a 16-word vector Q. P consists of a matrix multiplication over Z 2 32 , followed by linear functions s i mod 5 (see Appendix A) applied to each word W i individually and by a wordwise rotation by 1 position
The function f 1 is a feedback shift register. To begin with, the vector Q contains 16 elements; in each one of 16 rounds of f 1 , one more element is added
This element is computed from the previous 16 elements of Q, and from a value called AddElement(i) (where i is the round number + 16), which is the following function of three words of M and one word of H:
(all indices are to be taken modulo 16, and K i is a round constant). We note that if there is a collision in the output of f 0 and also in the first, say, j instances of AddElement(i), then there is a collision in the first 16 + j elements of Q. We denote by Q a the output of f 0 , and by Q b the 16 elements computed in f 1 . The function f 2 performs some final mixing of the elements in Q with M , and produces the 16-word output of the compression function.
Further details on the compression function of BMW can be found in [7] .
Previous results
During the first round of the SHA-3 competition, the best attacks on BMW have been pseudo-attacks due to Thomsen [11] . However, BMW was quite heavily tweaked at the end of the first round, and those attacks do not apply to the current version of BMW. In this paper we only consider the second-round version of BMW. For the current version of BMW, the best results are differential properties of the compression function, due to Aumasson and Guo and Thomsen [1, 8] . These papers essentially show that for some particular differences in the input of the compression function, a few output bits will be biased.
Our results
In this paper we describe a partial-collision attack on the compression function of BMW. Our attack is based on differential techniques, and we try to control the propagation of differences inside the compression function. The general idea is to control the differences in M , in Q a , and in the first instances of AddElement. This means that we also control the difference in the first elements of Q b , and since the final function f 2 only has limited diffusion, we will control the differences in several output words. We managed to cancel all the differences in Q 0 , . . . Q 26 , and to get small differences in Q 27 , Q 28 , Q 29 . This gives a pair of inputs such that 300 pre-specified output bits collide, for a cost similar to 2 32 evaluations of the compression function, using negligible memory. We note that for a random function, it is expected to take 2 150 evaluations before finding such a pair of inputs. Moreover, we expect a difference in only half of the uncontrolled bits, and this gives a near-collision attack better than generic algorithms.
Before describing our new attack, we present some useful tools for the analysis of ARX systems in Section 2. In Section 3, we show how to obtain collisions in f 0 without any message difference, which leads to collisions in Q a , the first half of the Q register. We then show how to find such collisions with some words of H inactive, which leads to a collision in Q 0 to Q 22 . In Section 4, we extend this result by introducing some differences in the message, and we use the message differences to cancel the chaining value differences in the AddElement function up to Q 26 . Finally in Section 5 we use near collisions in AddElement instead of full collisions, and we can control the differences up to Q 29 .
Solving a System of Additions and Xor
An important step in our attack requires to solve a system of equations involving only xors and modular additions. In particular, we will often have to solve x⊕∆ = x δ, where x is a variable, and ∆ and δ are given parameters representing respectively the xor-difference and the modular-difference in x. It is well-known that those systems are T-functions, and can be solved from the least significant bit to the most significant bit. However, the naive approach to solve such a system uses backtracking, and can lead to an exponential complexity in the worst case.
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A more efficient strategy is to use an approach based on automata: any system of such equations can be represented by an automaton, and solving a particular instance take time proportional to the word length. This kind of approach has been used to study differential properties of S-functions in [10] . Here we use this technique to decide whether a system is solvable, and to compute a solution efficiently.
We consider a system of additions and xors, which involves v variables and p parameters. Our goal is twofold: first determine for which values of the parameters the system is compatible, and second, when the system is compatible, determine the set of solutions.
The first step in applying this technique is to build an automaton corresponding to the system of equations. The states of this automaton correspond to the possible values of the carry bits: a system with s modular additions gives an automaton with 2 s states. The alphabet is {0, 1} v+p , and each transition reads one bit from each parameter and each variable, starting from the least significant bit. Figure 2 shows an example of such automaton. Then we remove the variables from the edges, and this gives a non-deterministic automaton which can decide whether a system is solvable or not. We can then build an equivalent deterministic automaton using the powerset construction, as shown in Figure 3 . This automaton reveals a lot of information about the system of equation. For instance, one can see that if the state {0, 1} is reached, then setting ∆ i = 1 assures that the system will have a solution.
In the case of the simple system x ⊕ ∆ = x δ, we can find an extremely efficient way to check the satisfiability of the system for given parameters, and to find the actual solutions. By looking at Figure 3 , we see that the state {0} can only be reached as the initial state or after reading 0, 0, and that the state {1} can only be reached after reading 0, 1. Moreover, reading 0, 0 can only lead to state {0} or ∅ and reading 0, 1 can only lead to state {1} or ∅. This allows a very simple description of the parameters that lead to an inconsistent system, i.e., that reach state ∅: The second condition can be expressed as:
Since those conditions are local they can be tested in parallel using bitwise operations. The following C expression evaluates to one if the system is incompatible, and to zero if it is compatible:
Note that the rotation to the left is just used to ignore the MSB of the second expression. Given a compatible pair (∆, δ), we can use the automaton in Figure 2 to compute a solution x to the equation x ⊕ ∆ = x δ. First we can remark that if we are in state 0, the next inputs have to satisfy δ i = ∆ i , while if we are in state 1, the next inputs have to satisfy δ i = ∆ i . We can now express the possibles values for x depending on δ and ∆, by looking at the possible transitions in the automata:
if (∆ i , δ i ) = (1, 1) then x i is given by the next state:
This can be expressed by the following C expression, where r is a random value:
(D^d)>>1^(r&(~D|0x8000000))
Using Collisions in f 0
The first step of our attack is to build collisions in f 0 without any message difference. In the following we denote x = H ⊕ M and y = P (H ⊕ M ). We have f 0 (H, M ) = y H (see Figure 4) .
We propose the following algorithm to find such collisions:
1. Pick a random x, x . 2. Compute y = P (x), y = P (x ). 3. We have H ⊕ H = x ⊕ x and H H = y y. We can solve this and find H using the tools of Section 2. 4. Compute M from x and H: M = x ⊕ H.
On average, for a random x, x , we expect one solution. However, there is a high probability that there will be no solution for a given x, x , because the xor-difference and the mod-difference for H will not be compatible. (Experiments suggests there is a probability around 2 −13.9 for random differences to be compatible).
To find collisions in practice, we use the degrees of freedom in x to set an xor-difference that has a better probability than a random difference. The best choice is x = ¬x, which works with probability 2 −1 for each word. However, due to the structure of P , this leads to incompatible systems (the differences in y are constrained by the difference in x). Therefore we use differences of high weight, but we leave some low order bits inactive. This allows to find a compatible system after a few choices of x, x .
Collisions in f 0 with some words of H inactive
The next step is to find collisions where some of the words of H are inactive. This will lead to some instances of AddElement being inactive, and some words of Q b being inactive.
To achieve this, we need an x, x with some inactive words, but we also require that the same words are inactive in y, y . Since the inter-word mixing of P is achieved by a linear transformation over Z 2 32 , we can easily find a suitable mod-difference in x. Then we can build the pair x, x by extending the carries, so that the xor-difference in x is of high Hamming weight.
We use the following algorithm:
1. Pick a random mod-difference in the kernel of the linear transformation P . Each choice of x, x gives a new value for the xor-difference and the moddifference in H, and we use the tools of Section 2 to check very efficiently whether those values are compatible. The cost of finding a compatible system is negligible before the cost of 2 32 that we require in order to put a small difference in Q 23 . This gives some restrictions on the output of the compression function because the f 2 function has 16 outputs and only 9 active inputs, but we do not have any colliding outputs yet.
Using Partial-collisions in f 0
In order to improve this result, and to have stronger properties on the output, we have to make more values of Q b collide. To achieve this, we now put some differences in M , so that differences in M and H can cancel each other in the AddElement function.
More precisely, our best path allows to find collisions in Q 0 . . . Q 26 using:
The first step of the attack is to choose a pair x, x such that x 0,7,8,9 are inactive, and y 0,7,8,9,13,14,15 are inactive. Moreover, we fix three more differences: δ x 13 = 2 18 , δ y 1 = 0x04010c43, and δ x 1 = 1. This is used in order to have δ ⊕ x 13 = 2 18 , δ ⊕ y 1 = 1 (note that s 0 (0x04010c43) = 1), and δ ⊕ x 1 = 1. This gives 14 constraints so we have a solution space of dimension 2.
After fixing the modular difference in x and y, we choose the values of x, x by extending the carries as much as possible, in order to have a dense xor-difference in M 14 , M 15 and H 2 . . . H 6 , H 10 , H 11 and H 12 . On the other hand, we keep the difference in M 13 and H 1 sparse so as to have δ ⊕ x 13 = 2 18 and δ ⊕ y 1 = 1. When we find a pair x, x with compatible differences for H, this fixes the values of:
The remaining degrees of freedom are:
In order to achieve a collision in Q 0 . . . Q 26 , we need to cancel differences in AddElement 19, 20, 21 and 26.
We use the freedom of M 13 to extend carries in (M
We use the freedom of M 14 and M 7 to extend carries in (M
We use the freedom of M 15 and M 8 to extend carries in (M
We don't have degrees of freedom available to make this collide, but the differences have been selected so that it happens with high probability: the differences in M ≪14 13
and H 1 are only in the least significant bit.
Finally, when we have one solution which collides in Q 0 . . . Q 26 , we use the freedom in M 0 and M 9 to generate many solutions, until we have a collision in XH = 31 i=16 Q i . This gives a collision in the first three output words for a cost of 2 32 (see Appendix B for details of the f 2 function). Here is an example of an input pair showing this property is given in Table 1   Table 1 . Partial-collision example with 96 controlled bits Chaining Value 6ae0a10c 4f14abca 57e66e71 6075a601 6ae0a10c 4f14abcb a819918f 9f8a59fe bba141a1 46fb0506 e001fffd e89b2ebf 445ebe5f 8934faf9 9ffe0002 e89b2ebf cb1e82d3 ae2d53d6 cb55b67f e6b080a1 cb1e82d3 ae2d53d6 34aa4980 194f7f5e 8b8c0a70 98d0080b adaacc99 88f0cf2d 7473f58f 98d0080b adaacc99 88f0cf2d Message 4f5381d3 f96e7f0a 72879df2 e8150fa2 4f5381d3 f96e7f0a 72879df2 e8150fa2 476caf9f fbacf685 d1c47cb8 73a7bf61 476caf9f fbacf685 d1c47cb8 73a7bf61 445261cf a4c0f69f a2316fdd 12dbc43a 445261cf a4c0f69f a2316fdd 12dbc43a e5197bf4 af952392 c2966021 46cab397 e5197bf4 af992392 3d699fde 39354c6b Output fe57177e d1e1157d ccf82758 6aecc4d0 fe57177e d1e1157d ccf82758 80b0c87d cf3d27ab 590788dc eafe31d9 0e95fe74 0f1b49b9 e0b92229 cf1c1fb4 1fd1f3ab 5b069cc1 b1039e9e a5049da0 c38e8490 174ab741 7768d4bc 947374c1 74ddf4f9 cb6f569c 96fff629 ee5d89a4 71e405a4 8b4d7466 d075a056 0f8d8b0c d987e0cb
Using near collisions in AddElement
In order to extend the attack with more colliding bits in the output of the compression function, we use near-collisions in the next instances of AddElement. Since we do not have enough remaining degrees of freedom with a given pair x, x , we use freedom in the choice of the x, x pair in order to go further.
In a practical implementation of the attack, one computes some words of H as a solution to the equation x ⊕ ∆ = x δ as described in the previous sections. As an example, in order to find H 5 and H 5 such that
and H 5 H 5 = δ y 5 , one may compute H 5 as (δ ⊕ x 5 ⊕ δ y 5 ) 1 (assuming that the pair (δ ⊕ x 5 , δ y 5 ) is compatible). The value y 5 is computed as s 4 (x 1 x 2 x 9 x 11 x 14 ). Thus, the freedom in the inactive word x 9 can be used to somewhat control H 5 without affecting other conditions. Since M 5 is computed as H 5 ⊕ x 5 , this leads to some freedom in AddElement(27) = (M
K 27 ) ⊕ H 2 , and one may use this freedom to search for a collision in AddElement(27). However, the differences on H 2 and M ≪15 14 turn out to be incompatible, so one can only hope for a near-collision in AddElement(27). Still, this will lead to a near-collision in Q 27 , which will lead to a near-collision in output word 3 of the compression function.
In a similar manner, one can use the freedom in x 0 (through H 12 and thereby M 12 ) to find a full collision in AddElement(28), which (due to the small difference in Q 27 ) will lead to a near-collision in Q 28 . Since Q 28 is the only active word affecting output words 4, 8, and 12 of the compression function, all these three words will contain a near-collision.
Finally, we can use the freedom of M 0 to extend carries in AddElement(29). However, we cannot reach a full collision because the differences in M ≪14 13 and H 4 are incompatible.
To summarize, we use the following techniques to extend our attack:
We use the freedom in x 9 (through H 15 and thereby M 5 ) to find a nearcollision.
We use the freedom in x 0 (through H 12 and thereby M 12 ) to find a full collision.
We use the freedom of M 0 to extend carries and find a near-collision.
We stress that these (near-)collisions can be found before searching for a collision in XH, and therefore, since the complexity is still below 2 32 , the full cost of the attack is still around 2 32 . Due to carries, however, it cannot be said beforehand how many bits will collide, unless one introduces a few additional bit conditions that will slightly increase the complexity. The search of a collision in XH is done using the freedom in M 9 . Table 2 gives an example of an input pair with an output colliding in 300 pre-specified bits (the search for a (near-)collision in Q 0 , . . . , Q 28 required the equivalent of about 2 29.5 compression function evaluations). This example can be also be considered as a near-collision with 122 active bits.
Conclusion
In this paper we describe a technique to build partial-collisions in the compression function of BMW. We managed to build pairs of input which lead to a collision in 300 pre-specified bits, with complexity 2 32 . Although it does not weaken the security of the iterated hash function, it is a strong distinguisher Table 2 . Partial-collision example with 300 controlled bits Chaining Value 59dfd94b 30b036e3 44ad8a65 47461712 59dfd94b 30b036e2 bb52759b b8b9e8ed 6f56e9b4 425e2d65 40000003 94e62f58 90a9164c bda1d29a bffffffc 94e62f58 12c4bf76 17b18302 4f74ffd3 3ec30f93 12c4bf76 17b18302 b08b002c c13cf06c 8b0f9f9b 7071a4a5 28becf17 6954724f 74f06064 7071a4a5 28becf17 6954724f Message bd050fb4 c6925351 991aa15f 60327d4b bd050fb4 c6925351 991aa15f 60327d4b 0212e457 9feb065e d6ab8dac 7b52f8ca 0212e457 9feb065e d6ab8dac 7b52f8ca 2f8a9774 1f189302 2043dc85 7b0eac19 2f8a9774 1f189302 2043dc85 7b0eac19 08fe0408 01c2f910 19abe45b 00000000 08fe0408 01c6f910 e6541ba4 ffffffe0 Output 70588aa3 62e38880 4b32cd23 7da56fd2 70588aa3 62e38880 4b32cd23 7da56fd1 54827a61 d78e6b5f 17cce172 0ae88e5a 54827a62 d78e6b5e f6942bb0 35a96499 232a8830 7f31780e f0865b01 28cb4150 232a8a30 7f31740e 2ad851f7 362f33fb 39ba3bd2 277e9d52 316a7411 c8dbc618 39ba3bd3 27829d53 d239cc6e 29aa1db7 of the compression function. We also note that if the compression function is truncated like in the final transformation of BMW, we can still build pairs of message which collide in more than 110 bits with complexity 2 32 . This is the first distinguisher on the truncated compression function of BMW.
A similar attack can be mounted on BMW-512 with complexity 2 64 . It will give pairs of input of the compression function with about 600 colliding bits, including about 220 bits in the second part of the output.
We believe that the techniques developed for this attacks can be useful for further analysis of BMW, and other ARX based SHA-3 candidates.
